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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/024,634	12/17/2001	S. Scott Friderich	KCC-16,270	2745
35844	7590 10/21/2005		EXAMINER	
PAULEY PETERSEN & ERICKSON 2800 WEST HIGGINS ROAD			STEPHENS, JA	CQUELINE F
	STATES, IL 60195		ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			3761	

DATE MAILED: 10/21/2005

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Advisory Action

Application No.	Applicant(s)		
10/024,634	FRIDERICH ET AL.		
Examiner	Art Unit		
Jacqueline F. Stephens	3761		

Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief --The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --THE REPLY FILED 29 August 2005 FAILS TO PLACE THIS APPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR ALLOWANCE. 1. X The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on the same day as filing a Notice of Appeal. To avoid abandonment of this application, applicant must timely file one of the following replies: (1) an amendment, affidavit, or other evidence, which places the application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in compliance with 37 CFR 41.31; or (3) a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 CFR 1.114. The reply must be filed within one of the following time periods: a) The period for reply expires months from the mailing date of the final rejection. b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Advisory Action, or (2) the date set forth in the final rejection, whichever is later. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of the final rejection. Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE FIRST REPLY WAS FILED WITHIN TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f). Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.136(a) and the appropriate extension fee have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension and the corresponding amount of the fee. The appropriate extension fee under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened statutory period for reply originally set in the final Office action; or (2) as set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of the final rejection, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL 2. The Notice of Appeal was filed on ____. A brief in compliance with 37 CFR 41.37 must be filed within two months of the date of filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any extension thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to avoid dismissal of the appeal. Since a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed within the time period set forth in 37 CFR 41:37(a). **AMENDMENTS** 3. The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, but prior to the date of filing a brief, will not be entered because (a) They raise new issues that would require further consideration and/or search (see NOTE below); (b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below); (c) They are not deemed to place the application in better form for appeal by materially reducing or simplifying the issues for appeal; and/or (d) They present additional claims without canceling a corresponding number of finally rejected claims. NOTE: . (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)). 4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.121. See attached Notice of Non-Compliant Amendment (PTOL-324). 5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s): 6. Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be allowable if submitted in a separate, timely filed amendment canceling the non-allowable claim(s). 7. To purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) will not be entered, or b) will be entered and an explanation of how the new or amended claims would be rejected is provided below or appended. The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to: ____ Claim(s) rejected: Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: _____. AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE 8. The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but before or on the date of filing a Notice of Appeal will not be entered because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and sufficient reasons why the affidavit or other evidence is necessary and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e). 9. The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing a Notice of Appeal, but prior to the date of filing a brief, will not be entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to overcome all rejections under appeal and/or appellant fails to provide a showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 41.33(d)(1). 10. The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation of the status of the claims after entry is below or attached. REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER 11. 🖂 The request for reconsideration has been considered but does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: See Continuation Sheet. 12. Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s). (PTO/SB/08 or PTO-1449) Paper Note JUNAMINER AUSTU 13. X Other: Interview Sumarry 7/29/05

Application No.

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: According to MPEP 2164 R2, "the invention that one skilled in the art must be enabled to make and use is that defined by the claims of the particular application or patent". Independent claim 1, claims "a breathable, liquid impervious material... wherein the material is a laminate of a thermoplastic film and nonwoven facing materials; the material having a first axis and a second axis, and the material having a Young's modulus of up to about 14 pst/%% in the first axis. In the rejection under 112, first paragarph for undue experimentation, the examiner indicated the disclosure on pages 24, lines 11-15 and page 25, line 5 through page 26, line 2 teaches a broad range of microporous films, i.e. filled, unfilled, stretched, un-stretched; and processes for forming nonwoven webs suitable for the invention and that one of ordinary skill cannot practice the invention without undue experimentation. While the specification provides two working examples, it is agreed the disclosure is enabled. However the enablement is limited to the scope of the examples. As discussed above, the disclosure teaches a broad range of microporous films. One would not expect a filled, unfilled, stretched, and unstretched film all to provide the same modulus of elasticity due to the various structures provided by the various types of films. For example, a stretched film would have a higher modulus of elasticity as compared to an unstretched film, with all other things being equal. Claim 1 sets forth the physical characteristics desired of the material rather than the specific composition of the material in the end product. For this reason, the examiner maintains the invention can not be practiced without undue experimentation or that the scope of enablement provided to one skilled in the art is not commensurate with the scope of protection sought by the claims.

Applicant argues that according to case law, (In Re Kenneth A. Metcalfe and William H. Lowe, 161 USPQ 789 (CCPA 1969), "where the chemical identity of a material is not critical, we see no reason why an applicant should not be permitted to define a material partly in terms of its physical properties or the function which it performs". The examiner interprets the argument as it applies to the present application, to indicate the composition of the breathable material is not critical, beyond what is taught in the specification, and therefore, it is reasonable to claim the characteristics based on the physical properties or functions the material performs. Based on the teachings of the instant application, the examiner concludes the physical properties or functions the material performs are a result of the combination of materials taught for use in the containment flaps. Using this line of reasoning, McCormack and Buell, which teaches similar materials used in the same manner, would also have materials which have similar characteristics and perform the same functions.

Applicant repeats the arguments filed 4/15/05. The responses below are repeated from the Office Action mailed 6/29/05. As to the rejection of claims 1, 4, and 8 as being unpatentable over McCormack USPN 5855999 and in response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).

As to the rejection of claims 1, 6, 9, 10, 15, 16, and 25 as being unpatentable over Buell USPN 5085654, it is assumed from the comments on page 7, paragraph 3, that applicant's arguments are directed to alleged impermissible rationalization. In response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).

In response to applicant's argument that there is no suggestion to combine the references, the examiner recognizes that obviousness can only be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988)and In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, Morman USPN 5226992 is relied on for a teaching of materials, specifically a teaching of equivalent structure of a polyether block amide film and a polyethylene film. One of ordinary skill in the art recognizes the materials may be modified to arrive at a desired elongation, thus the prior art Morman is not relied on for a teaching of modulus of elongation. In response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).

In response to applicant's argument that Sauer contains no teaching regarding the containment flap as per the present claim 9, the test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981)..